Greg
Gorsuch's Battlefield Golymin
Preview of 2D
map & Background
Russian Movement's Prior to Pultusk & Golymin
In 1806 Russia possessed fourteen divisions (each with 18-21 battalions,
30-35 squadrons, 5-6 batteries), five of which had been pulled off to fight
the Turks while one was kept in St. Petersburg and Finland. On the
frontier there were no more than 8 divisions. The four (5th Tuchkov,
7th Dokhturov, 8th Essen III, 14th Anrepp-later Kamenskoi)
of these under Count Buxhöwden had taken part in the 1805 Campaign
and had not had their losses made good since. The other four (2nd
Ostermann, 3rd Sacken, 4th Galitzen, and 6th Sedmoratski) under Bennigsen
had crossed into Prussia on the 29th of October at Surburg, Olita, Grodno
and Jalowka and pushed on to Pultusk where they made contact with the Kalckreuth's
Prussian Corps at Osterode on the 16th of November.
In early November the Tsar directed Bennigsen to place himself on the
Vistula between Thorn and Warsaw, and then to act as he judged prudent.
King Wilhelm approving of Bennigsen's disposition arranged for communications
between the armies. Bennigsen's four divisions were at Plonsk (Ostermann's
2nd Division), Pultusk (Sacken's 3rd Division), Prasnysz (Galitzen's 4th
Division) and Warsaw (Sedmoratzki's 6th Division) while Buxhowden's Army
reached Bialystok by mid November and was to act as Bennigsen's reserve.
Not wishing to be Bennigsen's subordinate FM Kalckreuth was relieved of
command and replaced by General Lestocq who moved his forces forward to
the Vistula near Thorn.
French Movements
The arrival of the Russians in Warsaw and the firm renunciation of an armistice,
quickly led to Napoleon's concentration of forces on the Vistula line.
By the end of November, "The man of force was once more at the head of
his army. With one or two fierce blows he expected to send the Muscovites
whirling back into their own distant land, to give his faithful followers
winter quarters, and thus at a better season and with refilled ranks to
begin a new campaign." (Lettow-Vorbeck, iii 58.) Almost immediately
his Marshals' reports presaged the difficult campaign to come. Lannes
states, "this place is exactly similar to that which we traversed while
we marched from Egypt to Syria except that here the sand makes the roads
worse. It's impossible to get one day's bread ration for an army
corps here." The mud was so thick that the horses sunk to their bellies.
Augereau adds, "we are traversing a waste that yields us no supplies.
The men bivouacking, and many of them have no greatcoats. The roads
are appalling and the season is hard." These hardships were only
to worsen as the winter began in earnest.
The Russian Withdrawal to Pultusk
Bennigsen still noted the speed of the French concentration and fearing
his flank would be turned by a French move through Galacia withdrew from
Warsaw and the Vistula to a more defensible position along the Ukra and
Narew Rivers. Despite his protests Lestocq was ordered to withdraw
to Strasburg. Within days Murat had occupied Warsaw, Davout had entered
Praga and Ney had stormed and captured Thorn. Having second thoughts
on his hasty withdrawal from a strong defensive position, Bennigsen ordered
an advance hoping to catch the French straddling the Vistula and Bug Rivers,
however the movements of both the Prussians and Russians forward quickly
ended and the "counter offensive" went unnoticed by the French who were
struggling to find ways to cross the Vistula. Davout, however, succeeded
early on to establish a fortified bridgehead over the Narew at Pomichowo.
After many trials, by December 22nd most of the French Corps had found
their ways across the Vistula. Ney's VI Corps and Bernadotte's I
Corps crossing at Thorn moving towards Strasburg. Bessière's
cavalry corps preceding them. Soult's IV Corps crossing near Plock
and Augereau (VII Corps) failing to bridge the Vistula ferrying his
Corps across at Zakrocym.
The Prussians attempting to link with the Russians were repulsed on
the 20th of December by Bessières' cavalry near Biezun, only to
have part of General von Dierecke's relief force surprised and captured
on the 23rd, while the remaining Prussian force idly stood by unwilling
to commit further forces to the engagement.
Bennigsen then was left to his own devices in the angle between the
Ukra and Narew, Buxhöwden leisurely advancing west now at Ostralenka,
while two divisions pulled from the Turkish front under Essen I were 116
miles away from Warsaw. The Russians were hampered at this time by
no clear unity of command. Bennigsen and Buxhöwden were independent
of each other although given vague orders to act in unison by the Tsar.
Distrustful of their doing so, the Tsar had sent General Tolstoi as his
personal envoy and representative, creating a troika leadership.
Given the seeming inaction of his forces since late October, the Tsar felt
compelled to further help the situation by appointing an overall commander
for the Allied Forces in the shape of the popular and dottering Field Marshal
Count Kamenskoi. Over 70 years of age he was "neither physically
or morally qualified for the command of a great army." However, he
immediately noted the weak disposition of the French and ordered a push
to drive the French over the Vistula. His offensive was slow to develop
as it called for the arrival of Buxhöwden from Ostralenka over the
bottomless mud roads and the ultimate arrival of Essen I.
The French Advance
Before Kamenskoi's offensive got underway, Napoleon, realizing the
tenuous hold of Davout over the Narew launched a brilliant night attack,
led by Morand's Division on Ostermann's extended 2nd Division. The
attack was a complete success and was quickly followed up by Friant's Division
to take possession of the entire Czarnowo plateau. Meanwhile Augereau
and Bessieres moved east and Ney caught Lestocq at Soldau cutting communications
between the two allies. As news of the engagement at Czarnowo spread
the Russians' advance halted. Count Kamenskoi became delusional,
"he rode to and fro amongst the troops making wild speeches." Bennigsen,
although the junior of the three senior commanders, was obliged to take
command again and ordered a retreat to Pultusk. This retreat was
particularly hard and his choice of Pultusk poor, as it left part of his
force already blocked by the advancing French. In his rush more than
50 guns and much of the baggage train was left in the mud. In addition
Murat having recovered from his fever raced in pursuit destroying a Russian
column at Lapoczyn and capturing even more artillery.
Following a careful review of the road systems, his cavalry reports
and judging the Russians' possible motives, Napoleon logically concluded
that the Russians had retired on the Ciechanow-Golymin-Pultusk line massing
perhaps 30-40,000 troops at Ciechanow. In concert with this assumption,
Napoleon ordered the concentration of his corps in anticipation of a decisive
battle at Ciechanow. There he sent Soult with Augereau, Murat and
Davout through Golymin to assault from the south, and Lannes to approach
through Pultusk preventing the Russians retreat eastward. With any
luck Bernadotte who he had ordered south would strike from the north.
Unfortunately Napoleon failed in attributing a logical disposition by Bennigsen.
From the Bug River Bennigsen had taken the bulk of his troops toward
Pultusk, while Prince Galitzin cut off by the advancing French had been
forced north to Strzegocin where it had met with part of Dokhturov's Division
from Buxhöwden's group, evidently stopped in its advance under Kamenskoi's
orders (Kamenskoi had continued to issue orders in his lucid moments-the
last being to flee to Mother Russia-where he himself went on the 26th of
December). Also following Kamenskoi's orders Buxhöwden had stopped
at Makow to the east.
The Battles of Pultusk & Golymin
On 26 December Bennigsen deployed about 37,000 men and 50 guns in a strong
defensive position south of the town of Pultusk. His left flank on
the Narew River depression and his right on Moszyn with light woods about
a mile and a quarter to his front on a gentle downward slope. On
the same day Lannes came out of these woods, his forces numbering about
20,000 men. Lannes resolved to attack, the Emperor having referred
to those before him as a "small hostile force" while his cavalry reported
the same (much of the Russian force being hidden behind Moszyn.)
Unable to move his guns forward Lannes' assault floundered. Bennigsen's
move to envelop his right was only stopped by the timely arrival of Gudin's
Division from Davout's Corps (under the command of General Daultanne) on
the left.
Simultaneously at Golymin, Murat and Augereau had come upon Prince
Galitzin and Dokhturov's Division. The French, again without cannon
support, were repulsed. Davout's leading divisions soon arrived as
did Count Pahlen from Ciechanow. A hard fight ensued with the 13,000
Russians having a decided advantage over the 27,000 French in terms of
guns, road conditions and a short winter's day. The Russians held
on until nightfall when they withdrew.
(Article copyright Greg Gorsuch, 2000 - Extracted from The
Design Notes for Battlefield Eylau)
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